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Abstract 
This paper studies the effect of income inequality on tax evasion. To discuss 
the topic, we present a simple model, based on Benabouand Tirole [1], that 
incorporates incentives for tax compliance such as punishment and fines, 
intrinsic motivation and social norms. Since we consider a regressive system 
of incentives to comply, income inequality increases the value of tax evasion 
although overall propensity to comply is unaffected. In this framework, we 
consider the hypothesis that social norms are group specific as in the case of 
social segregation or status related networks. We show that all the negative 
effects of inequalities are amplified: the difference between the tax compliance 
of the income groups and the value of tax evasion increase. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between income inequality and tax evasion is a complexone. 
Bloomquist [2] finds a positive correlation between a measure of income in 
equality (Gini coefficient) and the under reporting rate for wage and salary 
income. 
On one hand, if individuals incentive for tax evasion is income related, then 
the share of tax evaders and the total amount of tax evaded depend on the 
distribution of income. On the other hand, the specific design ofthe tax system, 
together with social norms and laws, affect the after-tax distribution of income 
(see [3] for a discussion). Here we focus on the first issue: the effect of income 
inequality on taxevasion. The theoretical literature that has tried to explain the 
reasons for tax compliance has identified three motivations: extrinsic, intrinsic 
and reputational. In their seminal paper, Allingham and Sandmo [4] consider 
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the decision on how much income an individual should report and how much 
should he evade as depending on his income, the fine to be paid in case of de- 
tection and the (subjective) probability of detection. They show that if the ex- 
pected penalty is less than the tax rate then some tax evasion is optimal from the 
taxpayers point of view. Moreover, if in dividuals are risk-averse and absolute 
risk-aversion is decreasing, then richer in dividuals will evade more. Thus, in the 
standard models (see [4] [5]) evasion makes the tax system regressive. Along the 
lines of Gordon [6], several papers have incorporated tax morale into the stan- 
dard models of tax evasion, recognising that people abstain from tax evasion not 
only for fear of being caught but also for moral and social considerations: agents 
have intrinsic motivation to behave prosocial andthey also like to appear i.e. 
have a reputation for being prosocial. Taxmorale is interpreted as a social norm 
for tax compliance and the strength of the norm is shaped endogenously, de- 
pending on the population share of honest citizens. If taxpayers care about 
socialstigma, the proportion of individuals who are expected to evadetax plays 
an important role in individual evasion decisions. The interdependence of indi- 
viduals evasion decisions typically results in amultiplicity of equilibria. An eco- 
nomy with a given income distribution and tax system can either end up in a 
state with a strong socialnorm, where most taxpayers pay all their taxes, or a 
state witha weak social norm, where evasion is more wides pread. Kim [7] 
investigates the role of the income distribution on the existence of multiple 
equilibria, and, using numerical simulations, argues that multiple equilibria arise 
if taxpayer incomes are sufficiently homogeneous so that the social coordination 
effect dominates. Allowing for heterogeneity in individuals concern for social 
norms, Taxler [8] characterizes, analytically, the multiplicity of (social) equili- 
bria in the share of evaders. He also considers tax compliance in a population 
consisting of subgroups with inter-group spill overs emphasizing the potential 
role of norm compliance in reference groups for taxmorale in other groups. 
Building on Benabou and Tirole [1], Besley et al. [9] use a simple model that 
includes intrinsic motivation, extrinsic incentives and social concerns to study 
the dynamics of taxevasion. They apply this framework to estimate the dynamics 
of tax evasion in the UK after the introduction of a poll tax in1990. 
In dealing with individuals incentive for tax compliance, our starting point is 
the model in [1] as applied to tax evasion in [9]. Their model includes in a 
simple way all the three motivations for tax compliancementioned above. To 
study the effect of inequality on tax evasion, we modify [9] by assuming two 
groups of agents differing in their income, but differently from them, we do not 
consider the dynamics of taxevasion. 
In such a framework, income inequality can affect tax compliance through all 
its determinants: the intrinsic motivation, whenever its distribution among 
agents changes with income levels; the tax system, including the punishment and 
fines structure, as long as itis not proportional; and finally extrinsic motivations 
and social norm when they are determined according to income group specific 
features. In our case we do not consider the first motivation, thus the distri- 
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bution of the intrinsic motivation is not correlated toincome. We will consider a 
tax system yielding a regressive system of incentives to tax compliance, including 
progressive taxation and nonproportional fines. Finally, we will us this setting to 
analyze the case in which social norms are group specific, which corresponds to 
the different cases of social segregation or network effects when networks have a 
social structure. We will show that income specificsocial norms increase the 
negative effect of inequalities on taxevasion, having a further regressive effect on 
disposable incomes. At the same time, the average social norms will not change 
since the higher number of payers between the agents on the bottom of the dis- 
tribution will increase exactly as the number of richer agents evading. 
2. Baseline Framework 
We built up our analysis on the general model in [9]. There is a continuum of 
agents of unit mass maximizing: 
( ) ( ) ( )1max
c
y x e m v e E v eµ− − − + + ;               (1) 
where y is income, x the tax, ( )0;1e∈  the evasion decision (yes = 1; no = 0), m 
the expected economic cost of being caught, v the subjective cost of evading 
having a density distribution g(v), μ the sensitivity to social norms, ( )E v e  the 
social norm effect given the choice e. 
There is a cutoff value *v  such that: 
( ) ( )* 1 0m x v E v e E v eµ  − + = = − =  .              (2) 
Given the density function of v and its cumulate G(v), tax will be evaded by N 
= G(v*) agents for a total tax evasion of ( )*NT xG v= . 
If ( )~ 0,2v U φ , then1: 
( ) ( ) *1 0E v e E v e v φ= − = = − ;                 (3) 
and thus using Equation (2): 
* 1
x mv µφ
µ
− + −
=
−
.                       (4) 
The share of tax evaders will be: 
( )
*
2 2 1
v x mN µφ
φ φ µ
− + −
= =
−
;                     (5) 
for a total evasion NT  equal to: 
( )2 1N
x mT xN x µφ
φ µ
− + −
= =
−
.                    (6) 
3. Income Inequality and Regressive Incentives to Comply 
Having defined the benchmark model, we can now introduce the hypotheses of a 
constant fine systems and income inequality. We consider two typesi = (H; L), 
 
 
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) * ** * 21 0 2 2
v vE v e E v e E v v E v v φ −= − = = < − > = − . 
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having income H Ly y≥  with α  representing the share of agents of type H. 
To use the previous section as benchmark we take: 
( )1H Ly y y yα α= + − = .                    (7) 
If the distribution of v is the same for each type, the number of evaders and 
the tax evaded will not change. 
Let’s consider instead the case of proportional tax i ix ty=  and aconstant m. 
All the following results same propositions hold when 0 1 im m m y= +  as long as 
1m t<  once we substitute t with 1t m−  and m with m0. In the same way, they 
hold when taxation is not progressive using the opposite transformation. The 
maximization problem becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( )max 1i ic y x e m v e E v eµ− − − + +                
(8) 
For each type, there is a cutoff value *
iv  such that: 
( ) ( )* 1 0iim ty v E v e E v eµ  − + = = − =                (9) 
where: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
* *
* *
1 0 1
 1
L H
L H
E v e E v e E v v E v v
E v v E v v
α α
α α
= − = = − < + <
− − > + >
.      (10) 
If ( )~ 0,2v U φ , then we will have the equivalent2 of Equation (3): 
( ) ( ) *1 0E v e E v e v φ= − = = − ;                (11) 
where: 
( )* * *1 L Hv v vα α= − + ;                     (12) 
using 93: 
( )* *H L H Lv v t y y− = − ;                     (13) 
then4: 
( )* *L H Lv v t y yα= − −                      (14) 
( ) ( )* * 1H H Lv v t y yα= + − − .                  (15) 
Furthermore we have: 
* *1
ty mv vµφ
µ
− + −
= =
−
;                    (16) 
and thus: 
 
 
2
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
* *
* *
* * * *
* *
1
1 (
2 21 1
2 2 2 2
1
L H
L H
L H H
L L
E v v E v v
E v v E v v
v v v v
v v
α α
α α
φ φα α α α
α α φ
− < + <
− − > − >
− −
= − + − − −
= − + −
. 
3Indeed we have: ( )* * ,iim ty v v i H Lµ φ− + = − = . 
4 ( ) ( )* * * * *L L H L LL H Lm ty v v v v v t y yµ φ α µ φ α − + = − − − = − − −     ; 
( )
* 1
L L H Lty m t y yv
µφ αµ
µ
− + − + −
=
−
. 
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( )* *1
2 2 2
H Lv v vN Nα α= + − = = .                 (17) 
Finally5: 
( ) ( )22
1
2N H L
T T t y y
α α−
= + −
                 
(18) 
As expected, the type H evade more than the type L, the two thresholds *Hv  
and *
Lv  are respectively increasing and decreasing in inequality (Equation (15), 
Equation refdue), and the value of evasion is increasing in inequality (Equation 
(18)). However, the number of evaders and the average social norms vare un- 
affected by inequality (Equation (16)): the increase in inequality brings about an 
increase of tax payers of group L equal to the increase in evaders of group H. 
4. Group Specific Social Norms 
If the two types are not in contact we will have6: 
( )
* *ˆ 1
H LL Ly yv v t v
α
µ
−
= − >
−                    
(19) 
( )( )
* *
1
ˆ
1
H LH Hy yv v t v
α
µ
− −
= + >
−                  
(20) 
*ˆv v=                            (21) 
Evasion in group L is lower and evasion in group H is higher. Thus, the 
differences between the social norms of the two groups widen. 
Coherently with Equation (21) we have: 
( )
( )
( )
ˆ 1
2 1 2 1
H Lty m ty mN Nµφ µφα α
µ µ
− + − − + −
= + − =
− −           
(22) 
Average tax compliance and the number of evaders doesn’t change. 
Finally7: 
( )
( )
( )22
1ˆ
2 1N N H L
T T t y y T
α α
µ
−
= + − >
−
.               (23) 
The value of evasion increases. 
Taking together all these results we can conclude that when socialnorms are 
group specific and economic incentives to comply are regressive, the effects of 
 
 
5 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * ** * 11 1
2 2 2 2
H L H LH L
N H L H L
v v v v v vv vT t y t y t y t y
α α
α α α α
+ − − − −
= + − = + − ;  
using Equation (13):  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2* * 21 11
2 2 2 2
H L H L
N H L H L
v t y y v t y y vT t y t y t y t y y
α α α α
α α
+ − − − − −
= + − = + − ; 
using eq.6 we obtain Equation (18). 
6
( )*ˆ 1 1
i i ity m y yv v tµφ
µ µ
− + − −
= = +
− −
. 
7 ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
2
ˆ 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
1 1
2 1
 H LH LN H L N H L
H L H H L L
N
t y y t y yty m ty mT ty ty T ty ty
y y y y y y
T t
µφ µφα α α α
µ µ µ µ
α α α α
µ
− −− + − − + −
= + − = + + −
− − − −
− − + − −
= +
−
. 
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inequalities are amplified and there is a final further regressive effect since, as in 
the case of higher inequality, segregation increase the number of tax payers of 
group L to the same extent of the increase in evaders of group one. 
5. Conclusions 
In this article, we have introduced a framework to assess the role of income 
inequalities in a standard model of tax compliance with social norms. We have 
considered economic incentives to comply decreasing in income as a conse- 
quence of progressive taxation or regressive fines. Thus, higher income inequa- 
lity increases the value of evasion while overall social norms are unaffected since 
the increase of evaders inthe richer class is equal to the decrease of tax payers in 
the lower income class. The regressive nature of the incentives to comply also 
determines a further regressive effect on the distribution of disposable income. 
Once introduced the benchmark framework, we have considered the hypo- 
thesis that social norms are formed separately by income groups as in the case of 
social segregation or network effects when networks have a social structure. 
Group specific social norms amplify all the negative effects of inequalities: the 
difference between the tax compliance of the two groups and the value of tax 
evasion increase while overall social norms are constant. 
This model provides a benchmark for the analysis of tax compliance when 
agents are heterogeneous and social norm are group specific. Policies aimed at 
increasing compliance can rely on the social norm effects, instead of higher controls 
or higher fines and punishments. From these perspective, since the disclosure of 
information about evaders is not always an option, analternative channel is to 
reduce segregation effects in the process of formation of social norms. 
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